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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides an analysis on the expansion and the burst phases of the 2007 subprime 
mortgage bubble, in two interrelated sections. The first part - called “Expansion of the 
bubble”-, analyzes the speculative investor behaviour of the US Real Estate Crisis and 
exhibits that before the crisis the asset prices such as Commercial Mortgage Backed 
Securities and Standard and Poor’s 500 indexes showed statistical features which are not 
common among financial time series. Common stylized facts such volatility clustering and 
autocorrelation of absolute returns were tested for the years 1997-2010, using daily data on 
the index values. The results indicate that during bubble periods several of the stylized facts 
disappeared since investors did not respond as normal to the volatility events and price 
changes. Hence, I have suggested that irrational exuberance of investors during 2007 
subprime mortgage crisis and other bubble periods can be detected by testing these stylized 
facts. In the second part,- called “The burst of Bubble” -, I showed that common 
macroeconomic risk factors can explain, to a very large extent, all types of mortgage’s credit 
risk and I concluded that individual mortgages are possessing significant default correlation, 
especially subprime mortgage classes. Finally this thesis ends with demonstrating the 
significance of correlated defaults on default distributions’ fat tails which explains the 
defaults of high tranche MBS products. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Due to financial market innovations; in US we have encountered significant development and 
wide usage of securitization and increasing use of financial derivatives such as mortgage 
backed securities (MBS), collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO), and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO) during the last ten years. For instance, the value of subprime mortgages in 
US was predicted to be about 1.3 trillion USD by March 2007 according to associated press 
which was claimed as the main culprit of US subprime mortgage crisis. According to 
Bernanke, their delinquency rate had increased to 21 percent as of January 2008, and by May 
2008 it was already 25 percent. Consequently, large-scale banks and other financial 
institutions that were possessing MBS or CDO wrote-off massive losses, since the value of 
the underlying mortgages plummeted. They have collectively faced approximately $379 
billion by May 21, 2008, thus I was motivated to analyze the US sub-prime mortgage crisis.  
 
The statistical regularities which are common on different financial instruments, various 
markets and time intervals are generally accepted as stylized empirical facts. For example, 
volatility events tend to cluster through time, and also autocorrelations of absolute returns 
decay slowly. The existing literature on stylized facts focus only on the econometric aspects 
of these stylized facts i.e. how they invalidate any financial model. However, there is no 
research on how some of these stylized facts can be used as a framework for speculative 
bubble detections. What are their economic meanings? Were there any empirical differences 
in terms of, for instance, volatility clustering or autocorrelations of absolute returns? Since 
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none of these questions answered by the existing literature extensively, I’ve decided that the 
main aim of the first part of my thesis should be to test stylized facts by using daily 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Index (CMBS) and a S&P 500 daily returns data to 
understand when and what are the irregularities in asset returns occur due to 2007 house 
bubble crisis and how they evolve. Additionally, other supplementary empirical indicators 
were included to have more complete framework. These tests would assist me to understand 
the investor behaviour during bubbles and its reflections on time series. 
 
I have ventured that before the crisis during the expansion of bubble period these return 
characteristics are not observable. I have expected that investor’s do not respond to volatility 
events, asset price decreases and other common events during the bubble periods as they do 
in other time intervals. I have also anticipated that if these investor behaviours can be 
documented by stylized facts, then these tests can be used to analyze further bubbles.  
 
In order to investigate the possible unexpected characteristics of these indices, I have 
conducted econometric tests on common stylized facts. I have showed that several of these 
well observed stylized facts are not observable anymore during the expansion of the bubble 
period, I showed that volatility events did not cluster before the crisis, the autocorrelations of 
absolute returns did not decay slowly indeed they actually did not exist before the crisis, I 
also showed that volatility-return relation did not exist, return autocorrelations were weaker 
and kurtosis was lower before the crisis. However, the literature suggests that these are the 
common characteristics of many financial time series in the long term, Rama Cont (2000). 
My results demonstrated that before and after the crisis time series possess different 
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characteristics as I expected, hence the results implicitly provide a set of indicators for the 
recognition of investors’ irrational exuberance, a term which was used by Alan Greespan to 
explain asset price speculation. 
 
The bubble continued to expand until the sudden burst occurred, like in every bubble. In the 
second part of my thesis I have analyzed this eventual burst of the bubble after expansion. In 
the course of 2007 credit crunch, comprehending the credit risk of these portfolios is of 
critical importance both to the lenders and to the regulators. This chapter analyzed how an 
MBS with a good credit rating can default. To show this, I have demonstrated that default 
correlations were embedded in an MBS and I argued that during the crisis default 
correlations played a vital role in high default rates of MBS products.  
 
How is the credit risk of different individuals related? How important are credit risk 
correlations? Is it important enough to worry about them? What are the principal forces 
driving them? Having seen the magnitude of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, I would claim 
that we don’t even grasp the significance of the correlation problem. The answers to these 
simple questions have substantial consequences for the valuation of MBS.   
 
In order to test the existence of default correlations, I used time series analysis on 
delinquency and default rates. I showed that substantial amount of the default rates 
particularly for subprime default rates can be explained by a few common macroeconomic 
factors, unemployment (1), house prices (2) and disposable income (3), which in return cause 
a correlation among the mortgages. I have also exhibited the defaults of higher tranche 
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mortgage backed securities are possible by pointing out the heavy tails of correlated default 
distributions. The fat tails appeared when I employed higher correlation values and default 
rates in my simulation. Therefore, it is concluded that identification of default correlation 
correctly has become a prerequisite for effective risk management since the default 
correlations of mortgages have a fatal influence on default risk.     
 
The rest of the thesis is as following: The second chapter presents simplified economical 
backgrounds of the crisis and empirical analysis on common macroeconomical indicators. 
This chapter maintains the basis for model specification of further chapters by breaking down 
the credit crunch in three parts as it was explained by Allen and Gale. The next chapter is 
devoted to a literature review on asset price bubbles. The fourth chapter presents the stylized 
facts of 2007 mortgage bubble on CMBS and S&P 500 indices per separate time intervals 
and points them as empirical indicators for detection of irrational exuberance periods. The 
fifth chapter explains the default correlation and provides an analysis on the factors of 
mortgage delinquency and default rates to exhibit high default correlation among mortgages. 
Chapter six demonstrates the impact of correlated default probabilities on an MBS and the 
conclusion is provided in the seventh chapter.  
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2.0 The Expansion of the Bubble 
Recent credit crunch has been discussed to be the biggest housing crisis since 1930’s. 
Although, it is important for researchers to understand every aspects of this crisis, until now, 
existing literature focused on the strategic mistakes of banks and rating agencies based on 
wrong calculated default rates. The next section is a multipart analysis on the evolution of 
bubble and answers the questions like how the bubble happened, what were the indicators of 
bubble. The bubble was explained in a simplified by taking into account the 
macroeconomical factors which will be used further in the empirical analyses.  
2.1 The Beginning of the Bubble 
 
Federal Reserve System followed a loosened fiscal policy since the first quarter of 2001and 
started to decrease the short term Funds rate to 5.98% in January 2001. Furthermore, 
following the explosion of dotcom bubble and 9/11 attacks, Federal Reserve was frightened 
of deflation, afterwards carried on with decreasing the interest rate of short term funds until 
the level of 0.98% by December 2003. This was indeed the lowest short term interest rate 
ever seen in the last 45 years. Belke and Wiedmann, (2005) argued that one of the main 
reasons of this policy, - injecting more than sufficient liquidity into the financial markets - 
was to prevent the stagnation, the recession and the following panic of the financial markets. 
As it is known, expansionary monetary policies enhances the chances of asset price bubbles. 
Due to highly volatile stock markets, the portfolio managers remodel their portfolios with 
more real estate instead of equities. In addition to professional portfolio managers, with very 
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low interest rates, households could easily pay for larger mortgage loan payments and 
consequently afford elevated house prices. Consequently, the house prices continued to 
increase with the enhanced demand. 
2.1.1 Emergence of Subprime Mortgage 
During Clinton period, starting from 1995, the number of sub-prime mortgage loans together 
with homeownership rate has started to increase significantly; particularly we have 
encountered an exponential rise of subprime mortgage market.  
 
We can define the subprime mortgage as a loan given to a borrower who has a riskier credit 
profile; (s)he often lacks a long and clean credit history or has peculiarities which can be 
attributed generally to higher default risk class (Bernanke, 2007). According to the study of 
Dean Baker, subprime mortgage is also defined as the loan given to the people with impaired 
credit history.  Subprime mortgage borrowers are the ones who do not have a regular job or 
who did not pay some credit debt in the past. Their debt service to income (DTI) together 
with loan to value (LTV) ratios has significant differences than other borrowers. They have 
DTI ratios which are over 55% or LTV ratios which are above 85%. These borrowers which 
are labelled as subprime borrowers pay on an average 1% higher interest payments than 
regular prime mortgage borrowers (Kiff and Mills, 2007).  
 
Although subprime mortgage loans were introduced in 1982 with the emergence of 
adjustable rate mortgages1, it was not until 1995 that the increase was worth to mention. 
Later on, in 1986, by the Tax Reform Act, the residential mortgage loan became the sole 
                                                     
1
  Interest rate of an ARM is fixed according to fixing rate or an index periodically, In US; it may be COFI, MTA, 
and LIBOR… etc. Hence the interest payments are  changed periodically 
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consumer loan in the market which has tax-deductible interest payments. With this new tax 
reform, since there was high unrealized equity in the mortgage, homeowners were able to 
prefer mortgage loans for their individual expenditures and developments in their houses. In 
addition, automated underwriting2 and technological advances have facilitated simpler credit 
scoring processes besides with the securitization3 of MBS instruments, easy trading of 
mortgages is ensured through transferring the mortgage itself. Together with the new credit 
attitude of borrowers, all these advancements have assisted the emergence of the subprime 
mortgage market (Kiff and Mills, 2007). 
2.1.1.1 Homeownership Rate and Subprime Mortgages 
Hence, partly due to the emergence of subprime market, we have seen a peak in the 
homeownership rate4 since the households started to have easier access to lower interest rate 
mortgages which was not available this easy earlier (Figure1). According to the Sewell, 
Clinton housing strategy ignited the rise of homeownership rate.  
                                                     
2
 Underwriting is done to determine risk-based price by looking at the credit history and LTVs of the 
borrowers. 
3
 Securitization can be defined as the process of transforming illiquid assets, through financial engineering, 
into a security. By this process the original lender can be seperated from the borrower who is the ultimate 
bearer of credit riskthe ultimate bearer of credit risk. 
4
 Number of owner-occupied housing units / number of occupied housing units or households 
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Figure 1: Quarterly Homeownership Rate in US (1965-2009) 
 
Source: US Census Bureau 
 
An increase in homeownership rate among the poor classes particularly for Hispanics and 
Blacks would have several social advantages; less crime rates, elevated sense for community, 
enhanced school performance...Relaxing the standards triggered the increase in subprime 
mortgage. Since 1995, Nonconforming subprime mortgages had a considerable increase in 
relative to the mortgages which are guaranteed by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
and traditionally have lower lending limits and less flexibility. In 2006, only 51% of 
mortgages were prime loans which generally require more detailed credit history. The rest of 
the mortgages were comprised of Alt-A5, and subprime mortgages. Alt-A and subprime 
mortgages both have higher credit risks than prime mortgages. 
 
 
                                                     
5
 ALT A is actually an ambiguous category between prime and subprime mortgages 
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By the development of mortgage markets, a significant demand increase happened on real 
estates. On the other hand, construction industry, quite naturally, was not able to manage to 
respond to the elevated demands of the customers. Hence, house prices were primarily 
inflated by the unexpected demand of customers.  
2.1.2 The Indicators of the Bubble 
In the following part, I have demonstrated basic indicators of real estate prices in order to 
show how the prices inflated before the crisis.  
2.1.2.1 The Affordability Index 
The Housing Affordability Index is a monthly index which measures the level affordability 
of a house by a typical family. From the definition of Realtors, a trade organization for real 
estate agents, “Affordability Index6 measures whether or not a typical median income family 
could qualify for a mortgage loan on a typical home.”  Since 2003, the affordability index 
was gradually decreasing. Between January 2003 and August 2007, in total it decreased 22%. 
To sum up, housing was becoming more expensive for a median income family between 
2003 and 2007. 
                                                     
6
 The explanation from National Association of REALTORS of the index is this; The index takes both fixed-rate-
mortgages and adjustable-rate-mortgages into account and calculates a composite mortgage payment. In 
order to interpret the index, consider this: A value of 100 means that a family with the median income has 
exactly enough income to qualify for a mortgage of a median-priced home. An index value over 100 means 
that families earning the median income have more than sufficient income to qualify for mortgage loans of a 
median priced house, with a 20 percent down payment. For instance, a composite House affodibility index of 
120 signifies that families earning the median family income have 120 percent of the income required to 
qualify on a traditional loan covering 80% of a median priced existing single family house. An increase in the 
House affordibility index, then, means that the same family is now more able to afford a median priced house. 
This calculation always considers a down payment of 20% of the house value and it considers a qualifying ratio 
of 25%. That means the monthly payment can not exceed 25% of the median family monthly income. 
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Figure 2: Housing Affordability Index 
 
Source: National Association of REALTORS 
 
2.1.3 The Ratio of House Prices to Rents 
This ratio, in housing markets, is closely related to the price to earnings ratio in stocks, which 
is widely known as the Gordon Equation. We can define the Gordon equation as the risk 
adjusted discounted market value of an asset’s expected income stream7 which results as the 
market value of the asset. Hence, the intrinsic value of a real estate should be the projected 
income stream resulting from the ownership or the saved income by not paying a rent (The 
Economist, 2003). In the US this house prices-rental income relationship has deteriorated, in 
May 2006, as you can see below in Figure 3, the ratio has reached its peak. Quite clearly this 
indicates that individuals bought houses for speculative reasons. This is very similar to 
investors buying stocks for expected capital gains without economic reasoning. The 
                                                     
7
 
  	
	  
Where Pt is the price of the asset, Et is the earnings, δ is percentage share of earnings, g is the growth rate of 
earnings, i is the risk-free interest rate and ρ is the risk premium. This equation indicates that the price of an 
asset should rise as the risk-free interest rate and/or risk premium falls. 
(IMF World Economic Outlook, 2000:78-79) 
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purchasing decisions were solely made based on future expected capital gain after the sale of 
the house, without taking into account the income streams from rents. 
Figure 3: House Price Index  to Rent of Primary Residence (Jan 1987- Oct 2009)  
 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics and Standard&Poor’s  
 
2.1.4 House Prices and Consumer Prices 
The other relationship which is assumed to exist is between real estate prices and consumer 
price index (CPI). It has long been assumed that real estate prices and CPI have tendency to 
move together, and it did move together until just before the bubble. However, the striking 
boost of real estate prices has challenged this traditional relationship of house price and 
consumer price index. Below, in figure-4, the ratio of house prices to consumer prices was 
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provided between 1987 to 2009. The prices of houses have raised twice more in comparison 
to the consumer prices before the crisis, and induced a bubble.  
Figure 4: House Price Index to CPI (January 1990-October 2009) 
 
Sources: and U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, consumer price index (all urban consumers) and Standard & 
Poor’s  
 
Figure 4 shows the relationship of house price index to consumer price index, we can clearly 
see that, the rise of house price index greatly surpassed the rise of consumer price index 
(CPI) after 1999. In mid 2006, when the house price index came to its peak, in comparison 
with 1996 values, the house prices index was twice more than the CPI in value. These figures 
conclusively provide an indicator that the housing market had an explained increase in US in 
comparison with consumer prices and rent incomes. 
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2.2 Second Phase – The Start of the Crisis 
 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) administers several studies and surveys on real 
estate markets and prices. The agency also calculates quarterly US house price index8. The 
US real estate prices have soared slightly more than 50 percent from 2002 to 2007, according 
to the report of FHFA. The annual average real estate prices growth rate was around ten 
percent. In the second quarter of 2005, when the increase rate was at its peak level, the 
annual price growth was even more than fourteen percent. This rise of house prices 
encouraged homeowners to take more loans collateralized with the existing house which had 
a higher value than before. 
Figure 5: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) House Price Index History (1990 Q1-2009 Q3) 
 
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)  
 
                                                     
8
 OFHEO and Case&Shiller have similar index construction methodology. 
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The number of new house constructions boosted from 1.4 million new houses per year in 
July 2000 to almost 2.28 million new housing structures in Jan 2006. For instance, in 2005 
the house constructions industry produced 6.2% of Gross Domestic Product, excepting 
1950’s this was actually the highest rate ever seen for house constructions, (The Economist, 
2007). This has also precipitated a rise in employment rates in the housing market. Housing 
related job categories including Residential housing constructions, according to Labour 
Department, jointly accounted to 6.6 percent of the total employment in US. From January 
2001 to May 2006, the 46 percent of the new jobs created in US was actually related to 
housing and construction industry (Fox, 2007). 
 
The rise in the house prices triggered to massive profits in the whole US economy until the 
sudden drops in all markets. The increase in consumer spending was simply backed with 
lowest interest rates ever seen recently and the wealth-soaring impacts of increasing real 
estate prices. Increase in asset prices not only boosted expenditures, but also permitted 
homeowners to get more loans on top of their existing loans since the equity of their 
mortgage was growing (The Economist, 2002). It is worth to mention that financial markets 
made huge gains from the real estate bubble. Between 2004 and 2006, according to Wall 
Street Journal, housing bubble led to a combined profit of one and a half trillion USD from 
the high risk sub-prime mortgages. Almost 3000 banks, credit unions, mortgage companies, 
thrifts benefited from the massive profits. 
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Figure 6: Federal Reserve System Short Term Funds Rate (Jan1990-Nov2009) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve System 
 
However, this wonderland story had an ugly end. Federal Reserve System (FED) commenced 
to raise the short term funds rate progressively. In 2004 the short term funds rate was one 
percent, by June 2006 it was already 5.25 percent, in less than 2 years the rate was increased 
more than 4 percent (see Figure 6). Robert Shiller in 2000 indicated that strict monetary 
policies after a loose one often lead to the bursts of the asset price bubbles.  
 
With the drops in the real estate prices together with the rise of interest rates of mortgages, 
the mortgage loan portfolios originated in 2006 started to deteriorate (figure 9). Previously, 
increasing real estate prices together with low interest rates allowed easier prepayments for 
borrowers with payment difficulties since their collateral value or their mortgages was rising. 
To their surprise, when the economic conditions are reversed, rises in monthly payments and 
drops in house values have left the subprime borrowers no choice but to quit their mortgages 
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by defaulting. The increase in late payments has caused the increases in the delinquencies 
and eventually defaults and foreclosures. For instance, just between October 2006 and 
December 2006, more than 310000 mortgage loans defaulted, although the previous two 
years average was 230000. Between January 2007 and April 2007, almost 3% of all total 
sub-prime mortgages started default proceedings (The Economist, 2007). Below, in figure 7, 
you can see that in just more than two years the foreclosure rates sub-prime mortgages 
quadrupled. The foreclosure in other mortgage loan classes also increased significantly, 
particularly ALT A. 
Figure 7 : Mortgage Foreclosures 
 
Source: Loan Performance Market Performance Report 
 
 
In figure 8, you can see the delinquency rates of all mortgages classes over time, quite 
naturally the rates skyrocketed and they are in line with the foreclosure rates. 
17 
 
Figure 8: Mortgage Delinquency Rates 
 
Source: Loan Performance Market Performance Report 
 
Evidently, the new mortgage originations rate started to be lower, but since these securities 
had a higher yield with lower risk profile according to the credit risk ratings, the demand 
remained to be strong; some lenders chose to loosen their underwriting standards. They have 
resorted to high “risk-layering”, which means joining together the poor credit records with 
other factors increased credit risk, for instance; low credit scores (FICO score lower than 
600), no down payments, no secondary mortgage collaterals, no documentation of assets, no 
documentation on income, and a purchase-money mortgage, became more common. In the 
end, these new standards led the rise of "early payment defaults"(see Figure 9)—these are the 
defaults which are happening just in the very first months of the origination among sub-prime 
adjusted rate mortgages and interest only loans, this happened especially to those originated 
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in 2006 (Bernanke, 2007). The originations of 2007 also were not getting better than the 
2006 ones as you see in the figure below.  
Figure 9: Percent of Outstanding loans sixty days or more past due 
 
Source: Loan Performance Market Performance Report 
 
The aforementioned developments of the mortgage industry have also assisted the sudden 
rise in delinquency rates. Securitization caused difficulties in assessing the credit risk, 
especially when different mortgages with various risk profiles were grouped in securities. 
Thus, investors ultimately bought MBS products without being aware of the credit risk they 
bear. The adversely affected companies were mostly the speciality finance companies and the 
banks which had subprime-specialist subsidiaries. Starting from mid-2006, some of the 
nondepository, low equity companies have either ceased operations, announced bankruptcies 
or have been saved by the government. (Kiff & Mills, 2007).  These companies represent in 
total 40% of 2006 subprime originations (Kiff & Mills, 2007).  
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As you can see from Figure 10 below, the US housing vacancy rate has commenced to 
increase from 2000Q1, with the increase in new housing constructions figure 11.  Besides, 
since 2006 third quarter, due to the increase in the foreclosure rates the housing vacancy rate 
did not decrease although the new housing constructions decreased to its lowest.  
Figure 10: Housing Vacancy in US (1995 Q1-2009 Q3) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
2.3 Third Phase: Economical Consequences 
The strong demands on housing encouraged the construction companies to produce more 
houses. Until 2006, the number of new housing constructions increased gradually. While 
suddenly the demand was cut, constructions industry was working at its high speed. In Figure 
11 we can see the monthly new housing units started.  
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Figure 11: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started (Jan 1983- Oct 2009) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
 
The number of new housing constructions didn’t decrease until mid 2006, due the time lag in 
responsiveness of supply side to demand to side of the market.  
 
In the figure below, annual construction expenses were graphed. Construction expenses 
started to decrease in 2007, (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: Construction Expenditures (1993-2009) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
 
Labour market has also affected adversely with the slowing economy. According to the 
Labour Department, in 2007 unemployment started to rise and the number of new jobs had 
entered into declining path after four years of increase. 
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Figure 13 Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment rate (%) 
  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
 
In the following chart you will see the comparison of US states in terms of employment 
where the volume of the bubble represent the population of the state. Since all bubbles are 
below the 45 degree curve, we conclude that all the state to a certain extent had increase in 
unemployment. 
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Figure 14 : Comparison of State Unemployment Rates 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
 
The moment the late payment and foreclosure rates of the subprime mortgage loans have 
raised, the market confidence on the mortgage backed securities (MBS) have started to 
diminish. Thereafter, some primary lenders, for instance Countrywide Financial9 
Corporation, have started to tighten their loan terms and stopped all the sub-prime mortgage 
originations. In 2007 third quarter, swiftly the number of new subprime mortgages 
plummeted 50% in comparison with the previous quarter of 2007. Considerable number of 
institutions and companies were hit in the beginning of the crisis. Mortgage institutions and 
thrifts, i.e. Washington-Mutual wrote-off huge losses, even sizable banks like Citigroup Inc, 
brokerage companies like Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,10 the mortgage-finance companies, 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) and Federal National Mortgage 
                                                     
9
 Currently operating under the name Bank of America Home Loans 
10
 Was acquired by BOA, and the name changed to Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
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Association (FNMA) have been seriously slammed by the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
(Isidore, 2007). 
 
Since the market confidence plummeted, the 3 month interbank rates have been increased. 
During the credit crunch, market interest rates have also increased, thus it became more 
difficult for borrowers with payment difficulties to refinance. Federal Reserve System has 
started to inject ample liquidity to the financial markets to keep the system afloat. 
Furthermore, Federal Reserve has reduced the short-term funds rate to the level of 4.24% by 
end of 2007; by the end of 2008 it was 0.15%. The rapid decline of interest was aimed to 
alleviate the panic in the financial system and to prevent an even more severe downturn. 
 
Figure 15: House Sales 1995-2009 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
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However, the strict credit terms triggered a rather vast and prolonged housing downturn than 
it was expected initially. These tighter credit conditions also extended the fall of the 
residential investments and lead to a huge suppression on refinancing and consumer 
expenditures. As a result, the drops in household consumptions and construction 
expenditures together with the rise in the unemployment would further impair the GDP 
growth, which had grown in the 3rd quarter of 2007 only by only 0.9%. Besides, RealtyTrac11 
has projected that up to one and a half million homeowners have started foreclosure 
proceedings by the end of 2007; it is twice more than 2006's figure, and in addition to the 
foreclosures. Moreover, it estimated that, before the end of 2008, two and a half million 
ARMs12 will receive higher rate fixings. (The Economist, 2007) 
 
Increasing foreclosures of the subprime mortgages in United States infected a wide range of 
markets around the globe with a mind blowing speed.  Two banks, the Clemos and Northern 
Rock in UK were among the ones which were swept up during the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis. It was very surprising for so many people that some US local mortgages had such 
widescale effects on global economy. (Barr, 2007)The culprit of this epidemic is this; 
securitization has allowed the trading of mortgages so smooth in order to spread the risks all 
around the globe to hinder major financial institutions’ collapses. In the meantime, it has also 
integrated distant markets to the US market. Consequently, a niche market crisis in one of 
distant countries could contaminate easily a lot of other markets which, at the first glance, 
had very little connection with each other. With the instant availability of information, these 
infections have a more potent scope which hasn’t been seen before (Barr, 2007).  
                                                     
11
 a firm which tracks foreclosures in US 
12
 Adjustable rate mortgages 
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The early overseas impacts of the crisis realized in July 2007, IKB Deutsche Industriebank 
AG, one German bank was rescued by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW) Group13. 
Spill over effects were immediate, German saving banks bailed out Landesbank Sachsen in 
October 2007. Besides the bailouts, Citigroup, HSBC Holding plc and ABN Ambro have 
provided massive funds to money market management which was struggling to cope with the 
mortgage crisis. The problems in United Kingdom was not different, Barclays PLC had to 
bail out its hedge fund Cairn Capital (Forbes 2007).  HBOS PLC had to finance to its conduit 
fund Grampian Limited (Independent, 2007) and also the Bank of England had assisted 
Northern Rock to keep itself afloat with emergency loans. In a nutshell, the credit crunch had 
a global impact on financial markets.   
 
                                                     
13
  A government-owned development bank, meaning Reconstrution Credit Institute  
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3.0 Literature Review on Bubbles 
One of the most notable researchers of property bubbles is Robert Shiller. He has built fame 
during 1980’s with his argument that in the stock markets the prices do not show the intrinsic 
values of stocks, (Fox, 2007)14. The phrase, “Irrational Exuberance” is usually used to 
explain the elevated state of investors’ speculative ambition during bubble periods. Schiller 
notes that, “Irrational Exuberance” was initially coined by Alan Greenspan15.  
 
With his speech16, he pointed to the probability that; the increase in stock markets could be 
led by the irrational exuberance and he indicated that the possibility of an eventual decrease 
in stock markets afterwards. The stock markets’ responded adversely to his speech. Almost 
instantaneously, Tokyo (Nikkei 225) and Hong Kong (HSI) stock exchanges fell by three 
percent. Frankfurt (DAX) and London (FTSE) stock exchanges followed them, with a four 
percent fall. S&P 500 also responded with two percent at the open of trade. Greenspan's at 
first sight innocent question caused strong reactions of the markets, consequently, the phrase 
“irrational exuberance” gained fame and popularity (Schiller, 2000). 
 
                                                     
14
 In March 2000, he discussed the stock market bubbles in his book “Irrational Exuberance” 
15
 An american economist who served as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System from 1987 to 2006, 
16
 During the “Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research” in 1996, December 5, he said that, “...sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the 
future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the 
inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we 
know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to 
unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?” 
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Robert Shiller addresses the irrational elements which influence investors’ judgements in 
2000. He indicates that investors are not aware of the intrinsic value of the stocks, and most 
of the investors simply are not interested in finding the right price level of market (Schiller 
2000). For instance, in the case of a bubble, house buyers consider that a house which they 
would ordinarily think overpriced has become a reasonable acquisition because they think 
that they are going to benefit from a considerable rise in the prices (Case and Shiller, 2003). 
This creates a self fulfilling prophecy or in another words a positive feedback loop. Besides, 
home buyers might only consider the nominal interest rates instead of real interest, which is 
explained as a “money illusion”.  
 
In sub-prime mortgage market we could also see these kinds of psychological elements. Case 
and Shiller in 2000 made a survey in United States on and detected curious patterns 
regarding the households’ view on real estate market. They have found out that 90% of the 
home owners projected a rise of real estate prices in the coming days and homeowners 
thought that the market prices were not over inflated, even when the bubble is at its peak 
level. Furthermore, house owners shared a common view on housing, they indicated that 
investing on housing is far more secure than investments on stocks and consequently, they 
had invested on new houses rather than on stock market. They also pointed out that their 
investment decisions were based on the level of nominal interest rates instead of the real 
interest rates. This issue has actually been argued by the economists, they noted that since 
nominal interest rates and the inflation levels were jointly lower, mortgages’ real interest 
rates indeed cannot be considered as low. Figure 15 demonstrates the movements of the real 
and the nominal mortgage rates between 1990 and 2009. The monthly values were calculated 
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by discounting the effects of consumer price index. Furthermore, as their survey indicates 
while borrowing, homeowners look at only nominal interest rates. Even though, nominal 
mortgage rates have pursued a stable trajectory since 1993, the real interest rates were quite 
volatile and starting from 2005 the real mortgage rates have risen drastically between until 
2007. Hence the “money illusion” quite clearly presented itself one more time. 
Figure 16 : Nominal and Real Average Contract Mortgage Rates 
 
Sources: Mortgage-X 
 
In Figure 16, you can see the real mortgage rate calculated against the home price increases, 
(instead of CPI). From 1998 until mid 2006, actually homeowners were making unrealized 
profits whilst they keep their houses. In the figure below, real mortgage rate is calculated 
after taking house price appreciation into account. Quite clearly, the interest rate they pay 
was much lower than their gains from real estate price increases, particularly between 2002 
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and 2006, a period which is marked as the real estate bubble. This also might create a vicious 
cycle in the minds of homeowners.  
Figure 17 : Real Mortgage Rate originated from House Price increases 
 
Sources: Mortgage-X 
 
Other important researches in this field are also performed by Case and Shiller. In one of 
their article from 2001, Case, Quigley and Shiller investigated different relationships 
between boosts in housing and financial wealth together with consumer expenditure, by 
implementing panel data analysis with fourteen countries yearly data from 1975 until 1999. 
In addition, they also employed a panel survey for US states from 1982 until 1999 by using 
quarterly data. They have made a projection with expenditures related to income and wealth 
variables. Their findings proposed that primarily for US, the consumption behaviour of 
households in US can be explained better with the housing market rather than the stock 
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market. In addition, wealth effects are more powerful in housing market. The result of this 
study is, when the house prices increase the household consumption also increases, however, 
the relation between household consumption and stock prices is not comparable with the 
previous one.  
 
It has been also showed by Case and Shiller (2003) that real estate prices and income are 
related. In their empirical research they have attempted to identify the symptoms of house 
price bubble. With major economic indicators such as population, income per capita, 
employment, mortgage rate, number of new housing constructions, and unemployment rate, 
they tried to explain the house prices. For the period between 1985 and 2002, choosing states 
with volatile house prices, they have demonstrated that income variable is correlated with 
house prices most, and for the period between 2000 and 2002, and they could not say 
conclusively that a bubble didn’t exist in the US states which they selected. 
 
There were also researches claiming that there was actually no bubble in the house prices. 
For instance, McCarthy and Peach in 2005 argued that Federal Housing Finance Agency 
house price index17 (FHFA) isn’t a real “constant quality” house price index. They claimed 
the house price index has risen due to the rises quality of newly built houses. Hence, even 
though McCarthy and Peach have also noticed the rise of price to rents ratio, their conclusion 
was; FHFA house price index was indeed misconstructed, therefore misguiding. Moreover, 
they also claimed that the fall of interest rates caused the bubble of doubt. However, they 
didn’t consider any other indicator such as the extraordinary rise in the mortgage lending, 
increase of real estate prices in main states, surge of construction consumption and 
                                                     
17
 ) Formerly known as Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) house price index 
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projections, in addition, by grounding on not well documented arguments, they have made a 
conclusion that that the real estate prices were not over inflated. 
33 
 
4.0 Stylized Facts: Detecting Bubbles 
The theories which focus on explaining the behaviour of different traders and the obscurity   
about the value of the security are based on the availability of the information as well as the 
arrival time of the information. The behaviours of the traders have been analyzed empirically 
by the availability of the high-frequency data sets. After a decade of empirical analysis on 
asset returns, researchers concluded with some common statistical regularity. These 
regularities which are common over different instruments, different financial markets and 
time periods are often called as stylized facts (Cont, 2001). Cont (2001) lists eleven stylized 
facts of asset returns as “(1)absence of autocorrelations; (2)heavy tails; (3)gain/loss 
asymmetry; (4)aggregational gaussianity; (5)intermittency; (6)volatility clustering; 
(7)conditional heavy tails; (8)slow decay of autocorrelation in absolute returns; (9)leverage 
effect; (10)volume/volatility correlation and (11)asymmetry in time scales”. 
 
Due to lack of intraday data of CMBS index, in this thesis, I have tested six of these stylized 
facts. This part includes a short literature review for each of the stylized facts which are 
tested in this thesis. 
4.1.1 Absence of autocorrelations:  
Predicting the future price of the stock through past history of a common stock’s price has 
been a great interest for business and academic areas. Fama (1971), analyses the stock return 
autocorrelation through theory of random walk. The theory of random walk includes two 
distinct hypotheses regarding stock returns: (1) successive stock returns are independent of 
34 
 
each other and (2) the stock returns correspond to some probability distribution.  He 
mentioned that the independence of stocj price changes is the outcome of noisy price 
mechanism. By noisy price mechanism, Fama (1971) refers to uncertainty on the true value 
of the security due to new information which has arrived or about to arrive in the market. If 
information arise independently over time and if the uncertainty concerning the present 
value of the stock does not follow any consisting patterns then the future price returns will 
be independent. Fama also comments on “superior traders”, even if prices were dependent, 
which means every new buyer could influence the others to have the same investing 
behaviour, there would be still superior traders who will detect the abnormalities in the 
market and will correct them by buying or selling. If there are enough such traders, then the 
price will tend to stabilize around its intrinsic value, reducing risks of bubbles or crashes. 
 
Atchisoz et al. (1987), tested autocorrelation by using the Scholes and Williams model of 
nonsynchronous trading. Their empirical results were far above the model estimation results. 
They concluded that model couldn’t explain the high observed autocorrelation of the indices 
examined. After their paper, empirical literature suggests that observed autocorrelation in 
stock returns cannot be explained due to lack of large enough time variation of expected 
returns. (Conrad & Kaul, 1988, 1989; Lo &MacKinlay, 1988, 1990; Ogden, 1997).  
4.1.2 Heavy Tails 
The statistical distribution of asset returns is very important to test pricing theories, as the 
distribution determines the assumptions on the behaviour of market prices. Early financial 
research in financial econometrics assumed Gaussian distribution for asset returns 
(Markowitz, 1952; Tobin,1958; Sharpe,1964). Then Mandelbort (1963a, 1963b; Mandelbort 
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and Taylor,1967) showed that in financial markets stock returns do not fit well to Gaussian 
distribution instead they possess excess kurtosis. They found that Gaussian distribution is 
more likely to overlook the heftiness of the extreme returns in both tails of the distribution.  
 
The supporting literature suggests many different distributions of asset returns. Mandelbrot 
indicates that in financial markets stock price changes follow non-Gaussian stable Levy 
processes. Press (1967) claims that heavy tails in distributions are formed due to the 
compound Poisson processes for the variance parameter of normal distributions. Following, 
Clark (1973) argues that financial market stock price changes exhibit finite-variance 
distributions, for instance lognormal–normal distribution, rather than any other stable regime. 
He explained this different evolution of price series with the availability of varying 
information. We know that when there is no information trading is slower than the days when 
information is available. And when new information arrives to market, the price evolves to 
its new value much faster. Consequently, stock price changes follow this different regime. 
 
One of the simplest measures of the distribution is kurtosis. In statistics, kurtosis is explained 
as the measure of "peakness" of the distribution. A high kurtosis figure indicates the 
distribution has more weight in the peak and in the tails, since the extreme variations from 
the mean are infrequent. Generally, it has been assumed that financial time series possess 
excess kurtosis.  
 
Underestimating the risk of kurtosis leads any financial model to underestimate the risk of 
the variables which are affected by high kurtosis. One famous incident is, Long-Term Capital 
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Management (LTCM), a US hedge fund which was cofounded by Nobel laureate Myron 
Scholes, once overlooked the kurtosis risk. In the end of four successful years, in the late 90s, 
Long-Term Capital Management had to be saved by the primary investment banks since 
LTCM underestimated the high kurtosis of several financial assets which are the underlyings 
of the fund's own trading positions, Krugman (1998). 
 
The results of Mandelbrot has been endorsed by more recent researches by Bouchaud and 
Potters (2001), Con (1997,2000), Dacorogna et al. (2001), Plerou et al. (1999), Rachev 
(2003) and Voit (2003). There have been many other suggestions on the form of the 
distributions but no general consensus has been reached on the exact form of the tails so far. 
4.1.3 Volatility clustering 
Another well-established stylized fact among the financial markets is volatility clustering. 
Mandelbrot (1963) defines volatility clustering as "large changes tend to be followed by 
large changes, of either sign, and small changes tend to be followed by small changes." Cont 
(2005) summarizes the emprical observation of this stylized fact  as following; while stock 
price changes themselves are independent, any measure of volatility of the returns exhibit a 
positive, significant and slowly decaying autocorrelation function. Volatility clustering is 
explained simply with the following phrase “periods of tranquillity interrupted by periods of 
turbulence”. Neither the volatility nor the tranquillity in the market does last short. The 
switch from one of these extreme regimes to another one is indeed a very gentle process 
therefore large returns slowly decay until the next tranquil state is reached (Plerou et al., 
1999; Cont, 1997, 2001; Mantegna and Stanley, 2000; Bouchaud and Potters, 2001; Voit, 
2003). 
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Volatility clustering implies that asset returns are not independent across time contrary to 
Fama’s random walk theory; however another stylized fact “the absence of linear 
autocorrelation” indicates that asset returns are independent. Observations of volatility 
clustering led to proposed models of ARCH (Engle, 1982), GARCH (Bollerslev,1986) and 
FIGARCH to replicate volatility clustering in financial time series. These models formulate 
the notion that price volatility has a tendency  to rebound to a mean instead of staying steady 
or around a stable value. One of most popular one GARCH assumes that today’s price 
volatility is dependent on the long term variance, expected variance of yesterday and real 
variance of yesterday.   
4.1.4 Slow decay of autocorrelation in absolute returns  
According to Cont (2001), the autocorrelation function18 of absolute returns decays/decreases 
slowly as a function of the time lag, roughly as a power law with an exponent β ∈ [0.2, 0.4]. 
This is sometimes considered as a sign of long-range dependence  
  
Dependence of price changes, for instance autocorrelation of absolute and squared price 
changes, are areas of recent academic researches. Harvey, Ruiz, and Shepard (1994) together 
with Melino and Turnball (1990) used stochastic volatility models to explain the patterns of 
squared stock price changes. Both of their econometric models are based on stock volatilities 
having a correlation structure which declines like a short range dependent process. One of the 
more recent works on squared returns is the model Breidt, Crato, and de Lima (1998) 
                                                     
18
 Autocorrelation function (ACF) is the correlation of the process with itself. More formally, from Eichner et al 
2007, let X= (Xt, t = 0, 1, ..., T) be a stationary stochastic process with standard deviation, α, and mean, μ. Then 
the ACF,δ(k) dependent of number of k lags is; 
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prepared. They employed a long-memory stochastic volatility (LMSV) model which explains 
the persistent dependence of squared price changes. 
4.1.5 Leverage effect 
Another important stylized fact is ‘Leverage effect’, which was first observed by Black 
(1976). Black (1976) presented that the volatility of shocks have a tendency to rise when the 
price decreases. In other words, bad news (negative shocks) affects the volatility more than 
the good news (positive shocks); as a result volatility gains a tendency to be higher in a 
decreasing market than in an increasing market. Consequently, it is an observation that 
volatility and return possess negative correlation. 
 
Black (1976), referred to this effect leverage due to the reason that negative shocks tend to 
decrease the stock price, hence raising the debt-equity ratio of the firm, as a result stock 
prices exhibits high volatility. In other words, the leverage effect is explained as the 
asymmetric impact of shocks on volatility.  
 
This effect is especially important for option markets, Backus et al. (1997). First of all 
leverage effect implies that after price decreases, money volatilities tend to increase. 
Secondly, when the leverage effect is strong, volatility smile appears  (Backus et al., 
1997).This happens when at-the-money options19 have lower volatilities than in-or out-of-the 
money options (Backus et al., 1997).This skew reflects that a negative correlation return and 
volatility encourages in the distribution of stock price changes, a negative skew.  
                                                     
19
 At the money option’s strike price is equal to the price of the underlying asset. 
39 
 
4.1.6 Volume/volatility correlation 
In financial markets, the correlation of the volume of a trade and the volatility of share prices 
has been a great interest. The major motivation was the observation of “market breaks” of 
1987 and 1989, when high price volatility coupled with heavy trading volume in equity 
markets. Another motivation of this interest is the highly developed theoretical literature that 
examines asymmetric information in the stock markets; the interaction between market 
makers and speculative traders. Many of these models have distinct implications for the 
relation between trading volume and price volatility. 
  
Clark (1973) in his paper argues that unobserved mixing variable which he comments as 
“information arrival process” causes the joint distribution between price changes and 
volume. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) using individual stocks  develops the variance 
function by adding the level of trading volume. They found out that GARCH effects have 
been disappeared with this variance function. They argue that the same factors produce 
volatility and volume correlation and they also suggest that volume is a proxy for information 
arrival. 
  
Bollerslev and Jubinski (1998), using 100 equities investigated long run dependencies of 
trading volume and price volatility relationship. For a detailed survey of earlier literature of 
this topic, one could check Karpoff (1987) who presented a broad review of previous 
researches on this relationship.  
 
The primary stylized fact mentioned in the literature is this; the volume of daily trade is 
positively correlated with the contemporaneous price volatility. Both volatility and trading 
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volume has exhibit patterns of strong serial dependence. In addition, returns and trading 
volume display patterns of conditional heteroskedasticity as well. 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
In order to test the stylized facts, I have collected daily Commercial Mortgage Backed 
Securities Index (CMBS) and also S&P 500 daily returns data to present as benchmark. 
CMBS index is prepared daily by the Merrill Lynch. According to their definition, “it 
includes 3,017 constituents which has total capitalization of more $367 billion. All qualifying 
bonds have a fixed rate coupon and must be rated investment grade based on an average of 
Moody's, S&P and Fitch credit ratings. Floaters, inverse floaters, IOs, re-securitized, and 
agency deals are excluded from the Index”. Although it doesn’t represent perfectly the 
mortgage market, it can be used as a good proxy. As a benchmark I’ve selected S&P 500, 
which I assume will have the same characteristics. Both index values are log differenced to 
create stationary return series. 
 
Due to the data limitations not all the stylized facts were tested for before and after the crisis. 
Although intraday S&P 500 index is available and an analysis of it, is academically 
stimulating, since this thesis is on mortgage backed securities, S&P 500 is just used a 
benchmark of CMBS. The facts which I tested from the list of Rama Cont (2000) are the 
following. 
1. “Absence of autocorrelations: (linear) autocorrelations of asset returns are often 
insignificant, except for very small intraday time scales (20 minutes) for which 
microstructure effects come into play.” 
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2. “Heavy tails: the (unconditional) distribution of returns seems to display a pareto-like 
distribution. The excess kurtosis of normal distributions is zero. However, still the 
precise form of the tails is difficult to determine.” 
3. “Volatility clustering: different measures of volatility display a positive 
autocorrelation over several days, which quantify the fact that high-volatility events 
tend to cluster in time.” 
4. “Slow decay of autocorrelation in absolute returns: the autocorrelation function of 
absolute returns decays slowly as a function of the time lag, roughly as a power law 
with an exponent β ∈ [0.2, 0.4]. This is sometimes interpreted as a sign of long-range 
dependence.” 
5. “Leverage effect: most measures of volatility of an asset are negatively correlated 
with the returns of that asset.” 
6. “Volume/volatility correlation: trading volume is correlated with all measures of 
volatility.” 
4.3 Results and Findings 
4.3.1 Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Index 
I have decided on the dates based on the time plot of the real estate prices.  
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Figure 18 Case–Shiller National Home Price index 
 
Source : Standard & Poors 
 
September 2006 was the date when the real estate prices started to decline considerably.  I’ve 
selected 7/13/07 as the start date of the crisis. On this date the S&P 500 has reached its peak 
after a long bull period. Although there is no consensus on the date it’s now widely accepted 
that it’s in the months of June or July 2007.  In figure below you see the CMBS index time 
plot. It’s in line with the real estate prices. 
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Figure 19 Time Plot of CMBS Index 
 
Source: Merrill Lynch 
4.3.1.1 Kurtosis 
Kurtosis is the measure of peakness of a distribution. Excess Kurtosis is zero for normal 
distributions and common financial series possess kurtosis values way above 3. 
 
In the long run CMBS index returns have excess kurtosis with a value 64.09, however before 
the crisis we can see that the return distribution is not very different from normal distribution 
with a value 2.34. After 7/13/07 the kurtosis was 25.796 
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Figure 20 CMBS Data Description & Kurtosis 
  
4.3.1.2 Absence of autocorrelations:  
It has been stated that “linear autocorrelations of asset returns are often insignificant, except 
for very small intraday time scales (20 minutes) for which microstructure effects come into 
play”.(Cont, 2001) 
 
Below you can see the autocorrelations of returns in the first 10 lags. The ones marked with 
red are significant. As opposed to other stylized facts, before the crisis the number of 
significant autocorrelations is much lower than any other time. 
Figure 21 CMBS Autocorrelations 
 
CMBS 12/31/1997-3/11/2010 6/3/2002 - 8/29/2006 7/13/2007-3/11/2010
Mean 0.00022404 0.00021216 0.00016834
Median 0.00028334 0.0002433 0.00043146
Minimum -0.094016 -0.015975 -0.094016
Maximum 0.048116 0.015058 0.048116
St deviation 0.0053283 0.003037 0.0096174
C.V. 23.783 14.315 57.132
Skewness -2.8697 -0.057383 -2.235
Ex. Kurtosis 64.094 2.3473 25.796
CMBS - ACF 12/31/1997-3/11/2010  6/3/2002 - 8/29/2006 7/17/2007-3/11/2010
1 0.1536 0.0247 0.1928
2 0.0642 -0.1165 0.1371
3 -0.0728 -0.0467 -0.0765
4 -0.0337 0.023 -0.0463
5 -0.0997 0.0078 -0.133
6 -0.0634 0.008 -0.0851
7 -0.0869 0.0472 -0.1337
8 0.1233 0.0093 0.1594
9 0.0327 0.024 0.04
10 0.1082 0.0107 0.1541
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4.3.1.3 Volatility clustering 
“Different measures of volatility display a positive autocorrelation over several days, which 
quantify the fact that high-volatility events tend to cluster in time”(Cont, 2001). In order to 
measure the volatility clustering I have defined the volatility by the following formula; 
 Volatility = (Return - Mean (Return)) 2 
Then I have calculated autocorrelations of these volatility values. If autocorrelations exist 
and decay slowly, it indicates that volatility events cluster through time. In the following 
figures, you can see clearly that volatility did not cluster in time before the crisis as it did 
after the crisis or in the long term. The log-log plots20 also confirming that slow decayance 
did not happen therefore volatility events didn’t cluster.  
                                                     
20
 In log-log plots, both X and Y axis are in logarithmic scale and negative values do not appear 
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Figure 22 CMBS Volatility Autocorrelations and Log-Log Plots 
 
4.3.1.4 Slow decay of autocorrelation in absolute returns 
“The autocorrelation function of absolute returns decays slowly as a function of the time lag, 
roughly as a power law with an exponent β ∈ [0.2, 0.4]”. (Cont 2001) 
 
In order to calculate the beta values, I have estimated the absolute values of the return index 
and following this autocorrelations are calculated. Then, beta exponent was calculated by 
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regressing the log values of autocorrelations against the log values of lags. This is sometimes 
interpreted as a sign of long-range dependence. 
 
The autocorrelations in absolute returns decay slowly as the literature indicates, except for 
the period before the crisis. In the figure below, the slow decay of autocorrelations were 
demonstrated by the values of autocorrelations per lag and their log-log plots. 
Figure 23 CMBS Autocorrelations of Absolute returns and log-log plots 
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The β values for different values are presented in the following figure. Before the crisis it 
simply doesn’t exists but after the crisis and in the long term the values are around (0.2-0.4) 
as the theory indicates. Hence, these results can be interpreted as an indicator of investor’s 
unresponsiveness towards asset price changes. One possible explanation is as follows, 
normally, investors are eager to buy when asset prices decrease and vice versa, and this 
causes a slow decay of autocorrelations in absolute returns. But this behaviour can disappear 
sometimes for instance during bubbles. 
 
Figure 24 CMBS Beta Values of Absolute Return ACF 
 
 
4.3.1.5 Leverage effect 
It is said that, “most measures of volatility of an asset are negatively correlated with the 
returns of that asset.” (Cont 2001) 
 
In the following table you can see that volatility and return are negatively correlated during 
crisis and in the long run. However, there is no relationship before the crisis. 
 
Figure 25 CMBS Volatility - Return Correlation 
 
CMBS 12/31/1997-3/11/2010 6/3/2002 - 8/29/2006 7/13/2007-3/11/2010
β coefficient 0.297824766 -0.140311605 0.495818551
p-value [0.0000] [0.1556] [0.0000]
R square-adj 71.40% 2.16% 62.18%
CMBS 12/31/1997-3/11/2010 6/3/2002 - 8/29/2006 7/13/2007-3/11/2010
corr(volatility,ret) -0.35298843 -0.02752167 -0.42391577
p-value 0.000000 0.36030 0.000000
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4.3.2 S&P 500 
I have also conducted the same study on another asset price index, S&P 500. As expected the 
results are quite similar to the ones we had seen in CMBS index. I have included the previous 
dotcom crisis which happened after 3/24/2000 and divided the time before the subprime 
mortgage crisis into two time periods 3/14/03-10/22/04 and 10/29/04-7/13/07.  
Figure 26 Time Plot of S&P 500 
 
4.3.2.1 Kurtosis 
Excess kurtosis values S&P 500 are higher in the first and last columns.  
Figure 27 S&P 500 Data Description & Kurtosis 
 
4.3.2.2 Absence of Autocorrelations 
This is not very obvious but the last and the first columns have significant values in the first 
two/three lags. 
1/6/97-3/5/10 10/9/98-3/24/00 3/24/00-3/14/03 3/14/03-10/22/04 10/29/04-7/13/07 7/13/07-3/5/10
Mean 0.00012683 0.0012636 -0.00081333 0.00067684 0.00047047 -0.00046009
Median 0.00067803 0.0013555 -0.0014219 0.0012549 0.00080497 0.00089762
Minimum -0.094695 -0.039099 -0.060045 -0.035867 -0.035343 -0.094695
Maximum 0.10957 0.046546 0.055744 0.034814 0.021336 0.10957
St deviation 0.013515 0.012247 0.01455 0.0084663 0.0065393 0.020001
C.V. 106.56 9.6922 17.889 12.509 13.9 43.471
Skewness -0.17225 0.027372 0.22309 0.013338 -0.26742 -0.14022
Ex. Kurtosis 7.2792 0.56312 1.1211 1.1352 1.6062 5.1424
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Figure 28 S&P 500 Autocorrelations 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Volatility Clustering 
We can see lower volatility clustering prior to the crisis. The volatility clusterings are slightly 
more obvious in the period between two crises. Particularly just before the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis they almost disappear completely. 
S&P 500 - ACF 1/6/97-3/5/10 10/9/98-3/24/00 3/24/00-3/14/03 3/14/03-10/22/04 10/29/04-7/13/07 7/13/07-3/5/10
1 -0.0736 0.0207 -0.0149 -0.1224 -0.0491 -0.1394
2 -0.0669 0.0219 -0.0531 0.0032 -0.0723 -0.1097
3 0.0291 -0.1035 -0.0158 0.0109 0.0183 0.0943
4 -0.0107 0.0123 0.0008 0.0216 -0.0093 -0.0342
5 -0.0347 -0.0376 -0.0386 -0.0813 -0.0597 -0.0214
6 0.0059 0.0172 -0.0412 -0.0199 -0.0404 0.0354
7 -0.0423 -0.0826 -0.0053 -0.077 -0.0265 -0.0449
8 0.0235 0.0024 0.0116 0.0304 -0.0321 0.04
9 0.0023 -0.0397 0.0092 0.0024 -0.0128 -0.0044
10 0.0315 0.0676 -0.0185 -0.0805 0.0691 0.0428
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Figure 29 S&P 500 Volatility Autocorrelations 
 
This can be explained as; investors did not respond to any volatility event extremely, for 
instance after a high volatility day with a strong increase, there was a more silent day without 
significant increase or decrease. The non-existence of slow decayance of volatility 
autocorrelations can be seen below in log-log pots. Please note that in log-log plots the 
negative values are not visible. 
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Figure 30: S&P 500 Volatility Autocorrelations Log-Log Plots 
 
4.3.2.4 Slow decay of Autocorrelations in Absolute Returns 
The results are similar to the volatility clustering. Particularly just before the crisis 
autocorrelations disappear again. 
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Figure 31 S&P 500 Absolute Return Autocorrelations 
 
 
Below you can see the log-log plot of the autocorrelations. The autocorrelations after the 
crisis is significantly different the bubble periods. 
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In the table below we can see the beta values for the ACF results. I have calculated the Beta 
values of these autocorrelations by regressing absolute log values of autocorrelation 
coefficients against log values of lag numbers. In general, it is said that financial time series 
exhibit a beta coefficient around 0.2 to 0.4In the long term and after the crisis and the dates 
between two crisis have more significant beta values than the other dates (prior to crisis). 
This can be regarded as another indication of positive feedback loop. 
Figure 32 S&P 500 Absolute Return Beta Values 
 
 
1/6/97-3/5/10 10/9/98-3/24/00 3/24/00-3/14/03 3/14/03-10/22/04 10/29/04-7/13/07 7/13/07-3/5/10
β coefficient 0.185723079 0.251088791 0.660224246 0.246474118 0.574111663 0.289209302
p-value [0.0000] [0.4399] [0.0005] [0.0973] [0.0190] [0.0000]
R square-adj 57.08% 2.23% 23.26% 4.88% 15.72% 42.26%
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4.3.2.5 Volume-Return Relationship 
The results differ from the CMBS results. Volume and return had no significant correlation 
in any period. 
Figure 33 S&P 500 Volume-Return Correlations 
 
4.3.2.6 Volatility-Return Relationship 
The results do not provide meaningful interpretation. We can also not say conclusively that 
there is no negative correlation prior to crisis. 
Figure 34 S&P 500 Volatility-Return Correlations 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In the section above, I showed that return autocorrelations are very weak and kurtosis is 
lower before the crisis. I’ve demonstrated that volatility events did not cluster before the 
crisis. In addition the autocorrelations of absolute returns did not decay slowly, more 
importantly; they did not exist before the crisis. Lastly, I also presented that volatility-return 
relation do not exist in CMBS but it exists for S&P 500.  
 
The results signify that before the crisis investor behaviour was different than the one after 
the crisis or any other time. The return distribution was different and autocorrelations 
diminished. The return volatility relationship disappeared together with volatility clusters and 
slow decay of autocorrelations in absolute returns. In a nutshell, this indicates that during the 
bubble periods, particularly in the 2007 sub-prime mortgage bubble, investors did not 
respond to bad news, price changes and volatility events as they responded in other times. 
1/6/97-3/5/10 10/9/98-3/24/00 3/24/00-3/14/03 3/14/03-10/22/04 10/29/04-7/13/07 7/13/07-3/5/10
corr(Volume,ret) -0.01880275 0.06617833 0.02784206 -0.00982768 -0.01062314 -0.0016453
p-value 0.2793 0.2053 0.448 0.8433 0.7822 0.9662
1/6/97-3/5/10 10/9/98-3/24/00 3/24/00-3/14/03 3/14/03-10/22/04 10/29/04-7/13/07 7/13/07-3/5/10
corr(volatility,ret) -0.05654652 0.01709685 0.12627467 0.00753259 -0.14082141 -0.05246634
p-value 0.0011 0.7438 0.0006 0.8796 0.0002 0.1759
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For instance, a price decrease is usually followed by a decrease, due to investors’ adjustment 
and vice-versa. However, when there is an irrational exuberance, an increase was not 
followed by a decrease; instead the prices remained the same. I suggest that together with 
other indicators these stylized fact differences can be used as framework to detect these 
bubble periods. 
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5.0 Analysis on Burst of Bubble: Mortgage Defaults 
Burst is the destiny of the bubble, the moment demand becomes weaker, the money illusion 
spell and the positive feedback loop are broken. In this chapter,    
5.1 Literature Review  
 
In the following figures you will see the comparison of mortgage delinquency rates of 2007 
and 2008 per US states. The volume of the bubbles represents the population of the state. W 
can see that, in all states %+60 day delinquency rates were increased significantly.  
Figure 35 : US Prime Mortgage Delinquency Rates per State 
 
Source: LoanPerformance 
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In the figure below, we can also see that for sub-prime mortgages the increase was even 
stronger. There was simply no state where delinquency rates were not increased. 
 
Figure 36 : US Sub-prime Mortgage Delinquency Rates per State 
 
Source: LoanPerformance 
 
Researchers were encouraged by these sky-rocket rises in subprime mortgage delinquency 
rates to decompose the factors that caused this problem. Considerable amount of researchers 
speculated that relaxed lending standards of mortgage issuers, for instance underwriting 
mortgages with no documentation of income, high debt-to-income ratios (DTI) and with high 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios was one of the main reasons of subprime crisis. In figure below, 
you can see that subprime mortgage lending increased dramatically after 1995.  
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Figure 37: Number of Loans Originated 
 
Source: LoanPerformance subprime mortgage database 
Figure 38 : Number of Loans Originated 
Anyone can assume that this increase also caused a rise in the riskiness of subprime 
mortgage pools, since originators decreased their standards in order to originate more loans. 
The increase of riskiness in the subprime mortgage was indicated by many researchers 
including Danis and Cross. 
 
Although it is not surprising to see an increase in delinquencies and foreclosures due to 
elevated riskiness, several researchers such as Doms, Furlong and Krainer have suggested the 
mentioned increases in the riskiness of subprime mortgage pool can’t be the main reason of 
mortgage delinquency increase. Instead they- together with Cross 2006-, suggested that the 
general economic variables are more likely the reason of delinquencies 
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The other more important factors which contributed to the default rates were the economic 
conditions. For example, in a city with a higher unemployment rate, see figure 14, and 
stagnation in income growth; higher delinquency and foreclosure rates can be expected. 
Since unemployed people won’t be able to pay their mortgage payments, they will be forced 
to sell their properties and prepay their mortgages. However, as you can see in figure 15, the 
demand for houses plummeted during the crisis. Naturally, the house prices were also 
decreasing, see figure 18, therefore capital gains was not also possible for homeowners. As a 
result, the mortgage borrowers exercised their options of default. But if they had increasing 
prices, then they would have more options such as refinancing or selling the house and 
prepaying the mortgage. Moreover, if they expect a house price increase in the future, they 
would try more to keep the mortgage and not to default. Additionally, house price decrease 
also lowered the future expectations on the possibility of a house price recovery. We would 
not be too wrong to expect that a market inconfidence caused by house price decreases also 
deepened the crisis. Collectively, all the mentioned developments visible in real estate prices 
constituted the primary culprit of the rapid increase in delinquency and default rates.  
5.1.1 Default Correlation 
Default correlation can be defined as the magnitude of dependence of different credit risks. 
Default correlation is one of the necessary factors in the calculation of the mortgage portfolio 
value together with recovery, prepayment and default rates. It represents the concept that 
systemic events such as macroeconomic variables trigger the default events to realize at the 
same time. To explain, default of borrowers might be caused by systemic underlying 
variables. In the context of residential mortgages, macroeconomic events such as, house price 
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changes, interest rate and curve changes and changes in unemployment rate and disposable 
income might be among the common factors... 
5.1.2 Default Correlation Modelling 
We would not be too wrong to think that default correlation on residential portfolios is very 
low. However, when it comes to lower credit quality mortgages, comprehending default 
correlation is of critical importance among subprime mortgages. Generally speaking, credit 
quality of loans and significance of default correlation can be negatively correlated. There are 
already several researches on the correlation between the credit quality and default 
correlation of commercial portfolios. For instance, it has been demonstrated by Zhou (1997) 
that implied default correlations21 are very low for companies with high credit ratings but 
they are very high for companies with lower credit ratings even for the very short run. 
Employing portfolios with bonds and loans of firms, Lucas et al. (2001) demonstrates that 
with a constant correlation level, a lower portfolio quality increases extreme credit loss 
quartiles increases when the credit quality of portfolio decreases. Similar to this one, Loffler 
(2003) indicates that the uncertainty of default correlation is a much more important factor 
for portfolios with B-rated in comparison to portfolios with BBB-rated when uncertainty is 
one percent Value at risk (VAR).  
 
In the default probability literature most of the researches made are focusing on the 
individual firm level indicators to explain the probability of default. In this paper my focus is 
to test the relationship between the credit risk and the macroeconomic indicators. In recent 
years researchers have been investigating the probability of default through macroeconomic 
                                                     
21
 according to the Z-values (a risk score) 
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conditions. One of these studies is  Foote et al. (2008) where they show that negative equity 
is necessary but not a sufficient condition for default. In the event of an idiosyncratic 
(individual) shock such as unemployment, illness, divorce, borrowers with the positive equity 
can sell the house and refinance the mortgage, so they rarely default. While, Vandell (1995) 
also shows that under the same shocks borrower with negative equity may default as selling 
the house is dependent on being able to raise cash to cover the difference between mortgage 
balance and the cost of a sale or cost of getting a new mortgage. In the same paper, Vandell 
also shows that probability of default for the barrowers with negative equity are smaller that 
the simple models would predict. 
 
Schwartz and Torous (1993) argue that prepayment option defines the default option 
regardless of the barrower’s equity. Based on this argument, there have been models 
developed in the literature where they account for the value of the option to sell the house 
(refinance the mortgage). One of them is Deng et al. (2000), where they estimate a duration 
model which includes the competing risks of prepayment and default. Their model embraces 
the effect of the value of the mortgage backed security. 
 
Other part of literature focuses on the effect of different macroeconomic shocks on the 
default rate. Helwege and Kleiman (1996) model growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
as a dummy variable to study the relationship between recession and the actual rate of 
default, where GDP is 1 when the growth is greater than 1.5% per year and 0 when it falls 
below that percentage. Friedson et al (1997) use the same model by including the effect of 
interest rate and test it empirically by using the data of corporate bond between the years 
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1971-1995. Their results show that as real interest rates increase, asset value decreases and as 
a result the estimate of probability of default increases. More general, they found that 
probability of default is correlated with macroeconomic conditions.  
 
Out of this literature one of the recent studies, more relevant to my study is Qu (2008) where 
he uses the data of post financial crisis period (2000-2005), to investigate the relationship 
between business cycle and the probability of default. Their model is a multifactor systematic 
risk model. They use expected default frequency as a proxy for probability of default; 
calculated through their monthly data by using firm profile and market information. Their 
data includes six European countries, US and some other industrial countries but their 
analyses are mostly on Swedish data. In this paper their main focus is how much the 
probability of default can be influenced if certain macro factors increase or decrease. They 
also search for industry differences as well as country differences. They found that there is a 
correlation between the probability of default and the macroeconomic factors such as 
industrial production, interest rate spread, exchange rate and share price. They also conclude 
that these results are different for other countries. Lastly, they check the impact of these 
factors; based on the author’s result; spread has the least impact while better the company, 
there is a less effect of macro changes on the probability of default.  
 
Earlier researches emphasized that the significance of systemic events determining 
companies’ credit risk in the stock market. Nickell et al. (2000), De Servigny & Renault 
(2002), Lucas & Monteiro (2005), Das et al. (2005), and Koopman, indicated the significant 
affect of common macroeconomic factors on default risk. Naturally, next question is should 
64 
 
we expect default correlations in a mortgage portfolio. If it exists, what is the magnitude of 
correlation? 
 
The objective of this chapter is to verify the relationship between macroeconomic conditions 
and the probability of default by using the Case-Shiller National Home Price Index for the 
period between April 1997 and November 2008. This chapter can answer questions like, 
what are the macro factors which affect the probability of default. And how much of the 
credit risk can be explained by these factors? 
 
Even though earlier studies on default correlation relate with commercial loans and bonds,  - 
since the main characteristics of non-investment grade bond portfolios and the subprime 
mortgage portfolios are similar - I expect to see that, the significance of default correlation is 
higher for lower quality mortgage portfolios.  
5.2 Data and Methodology 
In this part, the delinquency and the foreclosure rates of Prime, ALT_A and sub-prime 
mortgages are analyzed with the following base regression.   
%∆Dependentt= β0  +  β1%∆HPIt   + β2UnemploymentRatet + β3DisposibleIncomet +εt 
 
The analysis is performed on monthly data for the period between 1997/04 until 2008/11. 
Case–Shiller National Home Price index was log differenced. Unemployment data is 
obtained from Bureau of Labour Statistics on all population with 25 years or older; I used 
this 25 year age limitation since people younger than 25 are not likely to enter mortgage 
contracts. Disposable Income was also obtained from Bureau of Labour Statistics and it was 
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log differenced. The dependent variables are foreclosure (FC) rates, 90 day+ delinquency 
rates and 60 day+ delinquency rates of nation-wide Prime, Alt A, and sub-prime mortgage 
pools. They are obtained from LoanPerformance.com and the sole difference of these 
mortgage pools are their credit ratings. Initially I have tested other independent variables, 
CPI, real mortgage rates, house sales and number of new houses. Since none was significant, 
hence, they were all dropped.   
 
Based on the White test and Durbin-Watson statistics, it’s easy to conclude that there is 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. In a time series analysis, correct model 
specification in accordance with the economic theory is crucial in coping with autocorrelated 
error terms, therefore, practically the first resort to mitigate the autocorrelation problem is to 
include lags of the relevant variables. It’s widely accepted that HAC (heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors) estimation is last option in dealing with 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. However, our case was also resistant to any kind of 
structural changes, log transformation, lagged variables. Therefore, for all the regressions I 
run, I had to use the HAC (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) standard errors 
with bandwidth 3, Bartlett kernel, as Newey-West (1987) suggests. This estimation is an 
obviously an extension of White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(HCCME) estimator to the case of autocorrelated errors. The technical details of the 
estimation methodology are out of scope of this thesis. 
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5.3 Results and Findings 
5.3.1 Prime Mortgages 
Below is the table for the three regressions which run on house price index, unemployment 
and disposible income. HPI is significant in all cases, unemployment only significant for 
delinquency rates, and disposible income is not significant in any case. R square is sufficient 
enough for a meaningful analysis.  
 
In the table below I have dropped the insignificant variables and rerun the regression with 
restricted models. 
 
The results indicate that prime mortgages are affected by the macroeconomic variables to a 
certain extent. It seems like house prices are the main independent variable, and 
unemployment is the secondary one. The signs are correct, higher unemployment increases 
Prime_FC Prime_90 Prime_60
0.00149318 -0.00242756 0.00166811
0.6352 0.3907 0.8073
-0.308504 -0.255055 -0.634338
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
0.00150954 0.00200915 0.00422897
0.1098 0.0187 0.0372
-0.0662143 -0.0665391 -0.173141
0.3115 0.1512 0.1963
Adj R squared 0.44357 0.58274 0.50068
Constant
House Price Index
Unemployment
Disposible Income
Prime_FC Prime_90 Prime_60
0.00709422 -0.00304482 6.19462E-05
1.16E-10 0.3168 0.9933
-0.313991 -0.25889 -0.644317
0.0007 0.0001 0.0001
0.00210347 0.00447441
0.0190 0.0359
Adj R squared 0.4055 0.57961 0.49815
Disposible Income
House Price Index
Unemployment
Constant
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the default and delinquency rates and decreases in house prices also increase default and 
delinquency rates. 
5.3.2 ALT A Mortgage Pool 
Alt A is an actually ill-defined mortgage pool which practically stays somewhere between 
the prime and sub-prime mortgages.   
 
The comments for prime mortgages are also valid for these regressions, house prices and 
unemployment are the primary variables and disposable income is not significant in any 
regression. 
 
You can see above the restricted models where disposable income is dropped. The R2 has 
increased in comparison with the prime mortgages as the credit rating of an Alt A mortgage 
is lower than a prime mortgage.  
ALT_A_FC ALT_A_90 ALT_A_60
-0.0220191 -0.0163288 -0.0393141
0.0422 0.0366 0.0302
-1.35193 -0.834249 -2.39062
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0118483 0.00803857 0.0220027
0.0003 0.0006 0.0000
-0.233736 -0.365703 -0.645246
0.1151 0.1273 0.1099
Adj R squared 0.66374 0.66644 0.70618
Constant
House Price Index
Unemployment
Disposible Income
ALT_A_FC ALT_A_90 ALT_A_60
-0.0184971 -0.0254116 -0.0452998
0.0264 0.0272 0.018
-0.84772 -1.37301 -2.42781
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0083699 0.0123667 0.0229173
0.0007 0.0003 0.0001
Adj R squared 0.66152 0.65902 0.70092
Disposible Income
Constant
House Price Index
Unemployment
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5.3.3 Sub-prime Mortgages 
In the table below, I have run the three regressions on sub-prime mortgages. The R2 has 
increased even more, indicating that sub-prime mortgages are proportionally less affected by 
individual factors. Signs have correct economic meanings again where an increase in 
disposable income decreases the default and delinquency rates. 
 
It seems like sub-prime mortgage default risk is prone to the macroeconomic variables. In a 
nutshell, sub-prime mortgage default rates should be highly correlated with each other since 
we can explain most of the delinquency and the foreclosure rates by simple macroeconomic 
variables which affect the whole pool of sub-prime mortgages. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this part, I attempted to show that mortgages credit risk is subject to macroeconomic risks. 
To preview the results, I have showed that house price decrease is main culprit of the 
delinquencies and defaults. Unemployment and disposable income also correlate with sub-
prime mortgage defaults and delinquencies. 
 
To explain in more detail, it is showed that when house prices decline sub-prime mortgage 
default risks increase, simply because people are now more willing to hand in their property 
SUB_FC SUB_90 SUB_60
-0.0047477 0.00302049 0.00449536
-0.7147 -0.8377 0.8591
-2.04315 -2.24629 -4.44702
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0165482 0.0134731 0.0341629
0.0000 0.0015 0.0000
-0.575295 -0.59143 -0.0341629
0.0941 0.0873 0.1040
Adj R squared 0.72138 0.72511 0.75254
Disposible Income
Unemployment
House Price Index
Constant
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keys to the creditors. The results point that, house price appreciation is the primary predictor 
of the delinquencies and defaults. It might be also due to psychological effects of house price 
decreases. For instance, when prices are stagnating or decreasing, homeowners might think 
that the price decreases will continue even more.  
 
We can also expect rises in default rates when there is an increase in unemployment rates and 
a slowdown in disposable income growth rates. There can be one drawback to the model, 
since interest rate changes are not used. However, the dataset included both fixed rate and 
floating rate mortgages, and therefore it was impossible to use interest rate changes in the 
models. In addition house price index is sensitive to interest rates and the effect can be 
assumed to be included. It can be also expected that some of the default rate increase can be 
attributed to the rise in the riskiness of the mortgage portfolio. However, due to the lack of 
data, the magnitude of this effect was not tested. 
 
To sum up, I have demonstrated that significant amount of credit risk can be explained by 
common macroeconomic factors; namely, house price index, unemployment and disposable 
income. Additionally, we can see clearly that the magnitude of the correlations depend on the 
R square of the regressions. Hence, the results are also supporting the hypothesis that a 
decrease in the credit rating increases the default correlation. Because a prime mortgage 
default is correlated with individual factors more than subprime mortgages.  
 
Obviously the next question is how important are these default correlations for MBS 
products?  
70 
 
6.0 The impact of Correlated Default Probabilities on an 
MBS 
6.1 Introduction 
According to, Nagpal and Bahar (2001), the mathematical relationship between joint default 
probabilities and default probabilities can be called as the default correlation. They 
demonstrated that, the notion that credit events are correlated by an empirical analysis with 
historical default rates. Without taking into account the default correlation, credit loss 
distributions will not calculated correctly, especially the tails of the distribution will be 
underestimated. Hence, if the impacts of default correlations to the investment portfolios are 
not identified properly, the degree of risk and the adequate capital required to manage the 
estimated risk will be biased. Therefore, it is very probable that any ignorance of default 
correlations in the forming of credit risk models particularly for subprime portfolios - as 
explained in the previous chapter - would cause significant error in the financial model. In 
this part I will present impact of correlation on the default distribution. 
 
Virtually credit risk impacts every financial contract, it also affects MBS. The default 
probabilities of prime mortgages, in normal situations are quite extraordinarily low according 
to loanperformance data; frequently they were less than 0.003%/year. Under normal 
circumstances, assuming no crisis, these probabilities of default in a Mortgage Backed 
Security are independent of each other, since defaults simply occur due to individual bad 
luck such as being unemployed, which in return causes delinquencies and foreclosures. As a 
result of this, since each probability is independent of each other, at any given time, the 
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aggregate default probability of an MBS is really low. This is particularly valid for senior 
trenches which are not impacted from defaults of mortgages until all the capital of lower 
level junior trenches are exhausted. As explained the credit risks of MBS senior trenches are 
practically close to zero under normal conditions. Actually, this is also what the investors 
thought about MBS defaults earlier. 
 
However, when house prices drop, especially during a crisis when real interest rates rise and 
unemployment rate increases; default risk probabilities also soar dramatically. As I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, since these are the macroeconomic variables impacting 
virtually all sub-prime mortgages, it has been concluded that sub-prime mortgage defaults are 
correlated with each other. When a mortgage defaults, it’s more likely that the other one will 
default as well, since the reason of default was same. As a result, the default risk of these 
senior trenches, which under usual circumstances is practically zero, can begin to be different 
than zero. In this section I will try to demonstrate this fact, the impact of a default correlation 
on default distributions. 
 
I start with the assumption that the underlying instruments of an MBS are correlated and 
identical. With the presence of correlation I will show that the high probability of multiple 
defaults in an MBS with fat-tailed distributions. This fact has particularly important 
consequences in the sub-prime mortgage crisis where we have seen high delinquency rates 
even in the senior tranches. 
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6.2 Specification  
Default correlation is the notion that the likelihood of one debtor defaulting on its mortgage 
or any kind of debt is affected by whether or not another debtor/mortgagor has defaulted on 
its debts. Now let’s define it with a simple example, if one company is the creditor of 
another: let’s say, if Credit A defaults on its obligations, then it’s more sensible to think that 
Credit B is also more likely to be unable to pay its own obligations if there is a positive 
default correlation. Simply, the default of one mortgage makes it more likely the other 
mortgage will default as well.  
Now, let’s define this more formally. 
 
I assume that there are n number of assets of k number of defaults where k ≤ n.  
 
Assumption (1): Each asset has default probability p.  
Assumption (2): Each pair of assets has default correlation ρ between them. 
pj = E ( xj │x1= 1 , x2 = 1, … , xj-1 = 1)        for  j = 1, …, n 
The probability that k out of k assets default is 
 
           ! "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Assumption (3): The default correlation between asset j+1 and asset j+2 remains equal to ρ 
regardless of the number of known defaults among the other j assets. 
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ρ = Corr (xj+1 , xj+2 │x1= 1 , x2 = 1, … , xj = 1)        for  j = 1, …, n 
pj+1 =   pj +  ( 1 - pj ) ρ       for  j = 1, …, n-1    (2)                                                                                              
And in closed form equivalent  
pj+1 =   1 – (1- p)( 1 - ρ)J-1         
This increasing default probability when given other defaults is one aspect of the fatter tails 
of the Correlated Binomial distribution. 
6.3 Calculation of Correlated Default Probabilities with Bernoulli Trials 
 
In the literature there are three general methods to simulate correlated binomial distributions. 
All three imposes different consistent relations on the joint probability function. Namely, 
they are beta binomial distribution, mixed Bernoulli models and the last one, Moody’s 
binomial distribution. Hisakado et al (2006) indicated that one can use these models in an 
exchangeable manner. I will be using the latter. 
 
The probability calculation of k defaults out of n assets can be done with the formula.22 
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The probability of zero defaults and n survivals will be then 
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22
 However in VBA code I use a different  algorithm 
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The details of calculation is given in appendices 
6.4 Findings 
In case of default correlation, the higher trenches in an MBS do not have zero default 
probability anymore. This fact, which can be noticed even with very low correlation rates, 
becomes very obvious when we increase the correlation rate.  As we know correlated 
defaults constitute the particular phenomenon of the subprime mortgage crisis, namely the fat 
tails.  
 
The following simulation provides the default correlation of multiple assets, i.e. mortgages. 
We can see better that the tails are becoming heavier. The simulation supposes that there are 
10 identical assets with 5% default rate with three different correlation rates with each other 
0%, 2.5% and 5%. As the correlation increases, the tails start to get fatter. Simply the 
probability of 0 defaults and 7 defaults start to increase simultaneously.  
 
Figure 39 : Correlated Default Probabilities with three different low level correlations 
 
 
Correlation
Defaults 0 0.025 0.05
0 0.5987 0.6307 0.6570
1 0.3151 0.2674 0.2319
2 0.0746 0.0786 0.0774
3 0.0105 0.0188 0.0242
4 0.0010 0.0038 0.0070
5 0.0001 0.0007 0.0018
6 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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For visual demonstration, I used a case with 50 assets, 10% average default probability. I 
employed five different correlations from 0 to 0.5. The probability distributions for different 
level of correlations are below.   
 
Figure 40 Correlated default probabilities with 5 different correlation levels  
 
As, the distribution moves away from the dark blue to the light blue one, the peak in the right 
and left tails become visible. Now if the default correlation is 50% with 10% average default 
rate the default of all 50 assets at the same time is slightly higher than 3%. 
 
To summarize, correlated defaults changes the default distribution, the tails get fatter, thus 
one should worry if there is high default correlation. These findings imply that default risk 
correlations are fundamental and one should take into account them in default risk modelling 
if there is a possibility of default correlation. Therefore any financial model which does not 
take into account the default correlation would be invalid and produce unexpected results. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
This thesis investigated the time series characteristics of the 2007 subprime mortgage bubble 
and analyzed the eventual consequences of the burst of this bubble.  
 
Price increases always get investor attention. In the market not all the investors work out the 
figures to find the intrinsic value of the asset, even if they are interested in the real value of 
the house or stock they frequently deviate from their initial perception when they are under 
the affect of other investors, competitors and peers. For some investors increasing prices 
(itself) is the indicator of purchase. They might invest based on this indicator and eventually 
these additional investments further increase the value of the asset thus accomplishing a full 
positive feedback loop. Kindleberger (1987) defines the asset price bubble as following;  
“a sharp increase in the price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous  
process, with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and  
attracting new buyers - generally speculators interested in profits from trading in the 
asset rather than its use or earning capacity”.  
In dynamic systems the equilibrium value changes continuously, resulting in price volatility. 
Normally, when there is a price increase, self-adjustment mechanisms come into the play and 
the price decreases since there are more investors prepared to sell and fewer prepared to buy 
at the inflated price. This negative feedback limits the increase or decrease and puts 
restrictions on bubbles. As a result, some stylized facts appear in financial time series such 
as, slow decayance of absolute return autocorrelations and volatility autocorrelations. 
However, like we had seen in the 2007 subprime mortgage bubble, the asset prices and the 
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whole economy might enter into positive feedback loop, a state of disequilibrium of 
increasing prices in all markets. Consequently, in case of a financial bubble, partly due to 
positive feedback loop, some of these well observed characteristics may disappear 
temporarily. In these cases we might encounter no volatility clustering, absence of 
autocorrelations, fast decayance of absolute return autocorrelations, no volatility-return 
relationship, and more normal distribution than the previous heavy tails. These all were 
observed in CMBS and S&P 500 indices where asset prices had risen far beyond the levels of 
rational intrinsic values. Consequently, as explained in the earlier chapters, these stylized 
facts then can be used to identify the irrational exuberance periods. 
 
And like every bubble, the prices increased only to fall rapidly afterwards. The house prices 
decreased, unemployment increased and disposable income stagnated simultaneously. Under 
these circumstances, we can also expect that the probability of mortgage defaults increases. 
In addition to this, these macroeconomic changes also collectively indicate one more 
important element which was overlooked before this crisis, the default correlation. Since all 
these three independent factors can explain the significant amount of default probability, we 
can conclude that the defaults of these mortgages are correlated to a certain extent even 
though we can’t calculate exactly the degree of correlation.  
 
The results also showed that default correlation might increase with decrease of mortgage 
quality. For instance, the default of sub-prime mortgage is expected to be much more 
correlated than the default of a prime mortgage, since its default is affected more by the 
macroeconomic factors rather than individual factors. 
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Lastly, I showed that when the defaults are correlated the default distributions are altered, the 
tails become fatter. Hence, then it becomes clear that higher tranches of subprime MBS 
products can also suffer from defaults when there is high correlation among the individual 
mortgages 
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9.0 Appendices 
9.1 Computational Algorithm of Correlated Defaults 
 
There are several reasons for the need of a high precision calculation, firstly, any round up, at 
each iterative process, causes an ill condition. Particularly the multiplication of small 
numbers complicates the matters even further. Consequently, the mathematical operations 
with very small numbers require utmost precision. In order to alleviate this problem high 
precision arithmetic code is used. The detailed comments on the code can be seen inside the 
following code. 
 
The top level routine is based on the following cases. 
pj = E ( xj │x1= 1 , x2 = 1, … , xj-1 = 1)        for  j = 1, …, n 
9.1.1  Two asset case 
 
p1  =  p     whereas     p2  =  p + (1-p) ρ 
Then for P(x1=1 and x2=1) = p (p + (1-p) ρ) 
I know that P(x1=1 and x2=1) + P(x1=1 and x2=0) = P(x1=1) 
Therefore, I also know that probability of one default and one survival is 
P(x1=1 and x2=0) = P(x1=1) - P(x1=1 and x2=1). 
Naturally, the probability of no defaults out of two assets is 
P(x1=0  and  x2=0) = P(x1=0) - P(x1=0  and  x2=1) 
As the assets are identical the probabilities of one survival and one default is the same 
P(x1=1 x2=0) = P(x1=0 x2=1) Hence, 
P(x1=0 x2=0) = P(x1=0) - P(x1=1 x2=0) 
 
Pj,n is representing the probability of j defaults of n assets only in one specific order.  
For example, P1,2 = P(x1=1  and  x2=0) = P(x1=0  and  x2=1). Similarly, 
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P1,2 = P1,1 - P2,2 and P0,2 = P0,1 – P1,2 
9.1.2 A.2. For general case 
 
pj+1 =   pj +  ( 1 - pj ) ρ       for  j = 1, …, n-1                          
P(x1=1, x2=1, … xn=1) = ∏ pB   CB  
Pj,n is representing the probability of j defaults of n assets only in one specific order.  
 
Pk,k = ∏ pB   CB  
Pj-1, k = Pj-1, k-1 – Pj, k 
P1,1 and p1 are known. Other values of Pj,k will be found from the following23 
P0,1 = 1 - P1,1 
For k = 2 to n 
pk = pk-1 (1 - ρ) + ρ  
Pk,k = pk . Pk-1, k-1 
For j = k-1 to 0 step -1 
Pj, k = Pj,k-1 - Pj+1,k 
Next j 
Next k 
In order to get the probabilities with any order the results need to be multiplied with  ,D, 

 +!+  D
! D!           ,&678+9:8&+ %;+<:8&+                                                                                       
9.1.3 Code 
The code is in the excel sheet provided 
                                                     
23
 These are very similar to the top level algorithm 
